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a b s t r a c t 
Botnet attacks have devastating effects on public and private infrastructures. The botmas- 
ters controlling these networks aim to prevent takedown attempts by using highly resilient 
P2P overlays to commandeer their botnets, and even harden them with countermeasures 
against intelligence gathering attempts. In fact, recent research indicates that advanced 
countermeasures can hamper the ability to gather the necessary intelligence for taking 
down botnets. In this article, we take the perspective of the botmaster to eventually an- 
ticipate their behavior. That said, we present a novel mechanism, namely Trust Based Bot- 
net Monitoring Countermeasure (TrustBotMC), that combines computational trust with spe- 
cially crafted bot messages to detect the presence of monitoring activity. We study and eval- 
uate different computational trust models, to create a local and autonomous mechanism 
that ensures the avoidance of common botnet tracking mechanisms, such as sensors. Fur- 
thermore, we show, via our experimental results, that our approach can reduce the gathered 
intelligence by at least 53% compared to techniques that have been seen in botnets to date. 
Finally, we investigate techniques for mitigating our approach. 
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Botnets are networks of infected computing devices, called
bots. These bots are remotely controlled and instructed to
conduct criminal activities by malicious entities – commonly
referred to as botmasters. Botnets are used for a multitude
of malicious activities such as Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks, credential theft, ransom attacks, or spam
email distribution. Moreover, botnet activity appears to be on
the rise; in fact, recent advances such as the (IoT), increase∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: boeck@tk.tu-darmstadt.de (L. Böck). 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2019.01.004 
0167-4048/© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an ope
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) the botnet attack surface and capabilities ( Antonakakis et al.,
2017; Kolias et al., 2017 ). 
To cope with these developments, researchers defend by
proposing novel botnet detection and prevention methods; for
instance, new intrusion detection algorithms and honeypots
( Provos and Holz, 2007; Vasilomanolakis et al., 2015 ). Upon de-
tection of botnet activity, defenders need to take a plethora of
actions, e.g., bot enumeration, identification of weaknesses, or
preparation of sinkholing attempts, to actually be able to take
a botnet down. In many cases such actions are heavily influ-
enced by the network architecture of the botnet. n access article under the CC BY license. 
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Traditionally, many botnets have been based on a central- 
zed architecture consisting of a Command and Control server 
hat relays commands directly to the bots. However, this archi- 
ecture presents a Single Point of Failure (SPoF) in the central- 
zed server which can be used to seize control of, or disman- 
le, the botnet ( Greengard, 2012 ). To overcome this weakness,
dvanced botnets implement a fully distributed C2 channel 
ased on unstructured Peer-to-Peer (P2P) overlays. Such bot- 
ets do not inherit the SPoF of centralized approaches and 
hey are very resilient to node churn and node removal at- 
acks ( Rossow et al., 2013 ). Due to their characteristics, P2P bot- 
ets are especially relevant nowadays for creating a resilient 
nd stable basis for attackers. In particular, fully distributed 
otnets are prominent for their ability to provide modular 
ost-infection capabilities (so-called malware droppers ) to the 
otmasters (or to entities that hire the botnet for a specific 
ime period). Recent examples include the VPNFilter botnet 
 Mansfield-Devine, 2018 ) and the Sality P2P botnet ( Falliere,
011 ) (that has been active since 2008). 
As the absence of a central server prevents straightfor- 
ard monitoring, researchers have developed various means 
or gathering intelligence on distributed botnets. This is com- 
only achieved by reverse engineering the communication 
rotocol of the botnet, and afterwards deploying crawlers and 
ensors to enumerate the botnet population. Advanced fully 
istributed botnets such as GameOver Zeus ( Andriesse et al.,
014 ) or Sality ( Falliere, 2011 ) even implement features to im- 
ede monitoring attempts. 
In this article, we take the perspective of a botmaster, with 
he goal to better understand and anticipate future monitor- 
ng countermeasures. Specifically, we present the Trust Based 
otnet Monitoring Countermeasure (TrustBotMC), a novel ap- 
roach to thwart monitoring attempts by researchers and law- 
nforcement agencies. The proposed mechanism is based on 
he utilization of computational trust along with test-messages ,
.e., specially crafted messages, that the bots exchange to ver- 
fy the correct behavior of their peers. Our work is one among 
thers published recently that present means to detect mon- 
toring operations in P2P botnets ( Andriesse et al., 2015; Böck 
t al., 2015; Karuppayah et al., 2017; 2016 ). The multitude of 
ifferent monitoring prevention mechanisms suggest that the 
ptions to harden P2P botnets are numerous and may even- 
ually disrupt successful monitoring. Therefore, we want to 
ighlight the need for developing new mechanisms to effec- 
ively gather intelligence on P2P botnets. 
.1. Contributions 
his article makes the following contributions to the state of 
he art: 
• It proposes the first technique, namely TrustBotMC, that 
enables bots to locally and autonomously identify and black- 
list sensors in distributed botnets. Furthermore, it exam- 
ines and evaluates two different techniques for the practi- 
cal realization of TrustBotMC. 
• It discusses and evaluates potential mitigations against 
such a sensor detection method. .2. Assumptions 
ur work is based on the following fundamental assump- 
ions with regard to botnets and their detection and mitiga- 
ion methods. 
• Botnet infiltration and monitoring techniques introduce 
characteristics that are distinctive compared to normal bot 
traffic. 
• Researchers are bound to ethical, legal and technical con- 
strains; they cannot assist the botnet into performing il- 
legal activities and/or (unwittingly or knowingly) prevent 
take-down attempts. 
.3. Outline 
he remainder of this article is structured as follows.
ection 2 provides the reader with some preliminary infor- 
ation and background with regard to botnets, botnet moni- 
oring and computational trust. Furthermore, in Section 3 we 
resent our proposal, TrustBotMC . Afterwards, Section 4 de- 
cribes the evaluation of our proposal; in particular, we dis- 
uss the simulation setup, the ability of TrustBotMC to blacklist 
dvanced monitoring mechanisms and also some preliminary 
deas for mitigating our own approach. Moreover, in Section 5 ,
e discuss the state of the art with an emphasis on botnet 
onitoring countermeasures. Finally, Section 6 concludes this 
rticle. 
. Preliminaries 
ithin this section we introduce the necessary background 
n P2P botnets and P2P botnet monitoring. Furthermore, we 
iscuss four trust models that will be utilized in TrustBotMC. 
.1. P2P botnet basics 
ue to the distributed nature of P2P botnets, each bot is in- 
olved in distributing commands and other messages within 
he network. Therefore, the reliability of the C2 channel is 
ased on the availability of the bots. This is usually addressed 
y connecting to multiple bots at the same time, to ensure 
hat redundant connections are available. In fact, this is neces- 
ary as diurnal patterns and other user behavior causes bots to 
requently disconnect from and reconnect to the botnet. This 
rocess of nodes leaving and joining is called churn . 
To ensure that the botnet remains connected in the pres- 
nce of churn, a Membership Management MM mechanism is 
sed to frequently update connection information. Each bot in 
 P2P network maintains a list of other bots. This list is com-
only referred to as NL and the bots stored within the NL are 
alled neighbors. 
Each bot regularly contacts its neighbors to check their re- 
ponsiveness as well as to receive updated commands. If all 
eighbors are unavailable, a bot is isolated from the botnet 
nd will not be able to receive any updates or commands.
ence, it is important to update the NL frequently by replac- 
ng inactive neighbors with others (active bots). This is accom- 
lished by sending probing messages to all bots in the NL in 
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reoccurring intervals, the so-called MM cycles. These probing
messages are commonly referred to as hello messages. 
If a node remains unresponsive for a prolonged period of
time, it will be replaced by a “fresh” entry of another online
bot. To do so, bots send NL-request messages to their neighbors
asking for additional bots. Upon such a request a bot replies
with a NL-reply containing a subset of the entries of its own
NL. Furthermore, botnets also use the MM cycle to exchange
information about the ID of the latest instruction set. If one bot
does not have the most current update, it will query a neighbor
to forward the latest instruction set. In the case of the Sality
botnet 1 , the ID is directly embedded in the hello and hello-reply
messages. 
In this article we make use of a formal graph model to de-
scribe the connectivity of P2P botnets. This model is based
on similar models previously published in ( Karuppayah et al.,
2017; Rossow et al., 2013 ). We model a P2P botnet as a graph
G = (E, V ) , where V represents the set of super-peers (i.e., the
actively “routable” bots) in the botnet and the connectivity
between the bots is represented by the set of directed edges
E ∈ V × V . Each edge e ( u, v ) ∈ E with u, v ∈ V, u  = v represents a
directed connection from bot u to v . The NL of a bot u is de-
fined as a set of edges e ( u, v ) ∈ NL u . The out-degree of a bot u is
defined as the number of outgoing edges of u : deg + (u ) = | NL u |
Furthermore, we define the popularity (or in-degree ) of a bot (or
sensor) u as the number of incoming edges, i.e., the number of
bots that contain u in their NL: deg −(u ) = | (v, u ) ∈ E | . 
2.2. P2P botnet monitoring 
The lack of a SPoF makes it difficult to take down P2P bot-
nets. In order to take any actions against P2P botnets, it is
required to obtain reconnaissance information. This process
of gathering intelligence is commonly referred to as monitor-
ing . Monitoring is usually achieved by reverse engineering the
(botnet) malware and re-implementing its communication
protocol in various so-called monitoring mechanisms . Generally
two types of monitoring mechanisms are used: crawlers and
sensors ( Rossow et al., 2013 ). 
2.2.1. Crawlers 
Crawlers provide an aggressive approach to obtain intelli-
gence about a botnet. Starting with a set of seed-nodes 2 , the
crawler consecutively sends NL-requests to all known bots. The
entries contained in the NL-replies sent by the bots are added to
the queue of the crawler. With this approach, one can quickly
collect information about actively “routable” bots ( super-peers ),
and their inter-connectivity. However, a major drawback of
crawlers is the inability to contact bots that are behind Net-
work Address Translation (NAT) devices or firewalls. There-
fore, crawlers often underestimate the overall population of a
botnet by up to two orders of magnitude ( Rossow et al., 2013 ).
Another drawback of crawlers is that they behave very
differently from normal bots and introduce a lot of noise to
the botnet. Specifically, crawlers exhibit an unusually large1 The Sality P2P botnet will be the reference botnet example 
throughout this article. 
2 Seed-nodes are commonly found during the reverse engineer- 
ing of a malware, or by scanning the Internet. 
 
 
 
out-degree . This makes them prone to detection and mitiga-
tion by monitoring countermeasures ( Andriesse et al., 2015;
Karuppayah et al., 2016 ). 
2.2.2. Sensors 
Contrary to crawlers, sensors follow a less aggressive ap-
proach to monitoring. They are implemented such that they
imitate the behavior of a regular bot. They join a botnet based
on the specified bootstrap mechanism and wait for incoming
connections from other bots. To eventually infiltrate the NL of
other bots, a sensor has to reply to the hello messages of other
bots. Over time, the likelihood of other bots replacing some of
their inactive neighbors with the sensor increases. If a con-
nection is initiated by a bot, NAT devices will route the traf-
fic accordingly and allow sensors to enumerate bots behind
NAT. However, this comes at the cost of lacking connectivity
information that can be obtained by crawlers. Such informa-
tion may be crucial to successfully conduct attacks against the
botnet. Therefore, sensors and crawlers are commonly used
in combination to obtain both connectivity information and
more accurate enumerations. 
As sensors are a more passive monitoring mechanism they
are harder to detect than crawlers. While their aim is to
obtain a very high in-degree , which could be used as a dis-
tinguishing factor, this behavior is also observed for regu-
lar bots ( Andriesse et al., 2015 ). Nevertheless, different ap-
proaches exist to detect sensor nodes; these are discussed in
greater detail in Section 5 . 
2.3. Computational trust 
Computational trust offers the functionality that supports
an entity to make informed decisions within digital environ-
ments. This is important, as such decisions are often accom-
panied by risk and uncertainty. On a theoretical level, trust is
commonly described as a contextual relationship between a
trustor and trustee . The trustor engages in an action that re-
quires trusting the target entity referred to as trustee. 
Mathematically, trust is a measure for the inherent quality
or trustworthiness of the trustee. This measure is estimated
based on evidence of previous behavior of the trustee. For the
use-case of TrustBotMC, evidence consists of binary experi-
ences of positive or negative interactions with the trustee. 
Different approaches exist to calculate a trust score based
on evidence. Within our work, we focus on four promi-
nent trust models, capable of working with binary evidence.
Namely, these are the eBay user rating ( Jøsang et al., 2007 ), Beta
distribution ( Commerce et al., 2002 ), CertainTrust ( Ries, 2009b ),
and Subjective logic ( Jøsang, 2001 ). These are introduced in the
following alongside a reputation mechanism called goodcount
which is used by the Sality botnet. We want to point out, that
the Beta distribution, CertainTrust and Subjective Logic are
isomorphic to each other, even though they can outwardly
provide different functionalities through their parameters. 
eBay User Rating eBay 3 provides a commercial reputation
system that aggregates positive, neutral and negative expe-
riences denoted as: (e + , e 0 , e − ) ∈ E. The ratings from different3 https://www.ebay.com . 
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rustors are combined to provide an overall rating for a trustee 
hat is presented to all users of the platform. Specifically, users 
re provided with the absolute ratings and a trust score based 
n the positive and negative experiences: 
 ebay (E) = 
| e + | 
| e + | + | e −| (1) 
urthermore, the eBay trust model provides absolute values 
or all ratings in the last month, last six months and last year 
o provide insights on the development of the trustee. 
eta distribution The Beta distribution family can be used as 
 trust model, with a trust score based on the expectation 
alue of the distribution ( Commerce et al., 2002 ). In particu- 
ar, the Beta distribution f ( p | α, β) can be used to present poste-
iori probabilities for binary events. In the context of compu- 
ational trust, the expectation value of the Beta distribution: 
(p) = E Beta (α, β ) = α
α + β (2) 
s used to predict the future behavior of a trustee. For that, the 
arameters are set to α = r + 1 and β = s + 1 where r and
 represent the number of positive and negative experiences,
espectively. The trust score is equal to the expectation value 
f the beta distribution and is calculated as: 
 Beta = 
r + 1 
s + r + 2 (3) 
Moreover, the beta reputation system can be extended with 
wo additional parameters s 0 and r 0 to present a base rate 
 Jøsang et al., 2003 ) or prior knowledge ( Ries, 2009a ). Within this
rticle, we will use this extended model with α = r + r 0 and 
= s + s 0 . 
ubjective logic Subjective logic (SL) ( Jøsang, 2001 ) is a trust 
odel based on the Dempster–Shafer belief theory ( Shafer,
976 ). SL uses an opinion quad-tuple ω A x = (b, d, u, a ) to de-
cribe the belief b an entity A has in the truth of a statement 
 . At its core, SL uses a beta distribution with α = r + 2 a and
= s + 2 − 2 a . The trust score is calculated as the expectation
alue: 
 SL = E(ω A x ) = b + ua (4) 
Here, the expectation value of the regular beta distribution 
 = r r + s +2 is extended by considering the uncertainty u = 2 r + s +2 
nd the atomicity a , which applies a weight to the uncertainty 
f the trust score. 
ertainTrust CertainTrust (CT) ( Ries, 2009b ) is a trust model 
xpressing trust in uncertain environments with a trust score 
ased on the expectation value: 
 CT = E Beta f,w,N (r, s ) = E Beta (r, s, r 0 , s 0 ) (5)
A distinguishing factor from other trust models is that the 
nitial trust s 0 and r 0 can explicitly be changed through the 
arameter f . Moreover, CT provides linear fade out for the ini- 
ial trust. This is accomplished by dynamically recalculating s 0 nd r 0 upon collection of new experience. The speed at which 
rior knowledge is replaced can be set as parameter w . Fur- 
hermore, N denotes the number of experiences required at 
hich prior knowledge is no longer considered, as enough real 
xperiences have been collected. In addition to the context de- 
endent parameters f, w and N , CT also provides an aging factor
 ∈ [0, 1[. This allows to prioritize newer experiences by adding 
 negative weight to the influence of older experiences. 
oodcount. goodcount is a reputation mechanism imple- 
ented by the Sality botnet ( Falliere, 2011 ). While strictly 
peaking it is not a trust model, it is analogous and also the
nly implementation of such a countermeasure by any known 
otnet to date. A bot’s goodcount is represented as an integer 
alue that represents the availability or reliability of a bot to 
nswer to hello-messages . Each bot maintains a goodcount value 
or each of its neighbors. Upon receipt of a hello-reply the good- 
ount is increased by one, whereas it is decreased by one if no
nswer is received in response to a hello-message . 
This goodcount value is used during a bot’s MM cycle to de- 
ide if a bot is to be removed from the NL or not. This mech-
nism is supposed to prevent preemptive deletion of highly 
esponsive and reliable neighbors. Moreover, it is in place to 
revent sensors from easily invading and replacing legitimate 
ntries in a bot’s NL. 
. TrustBotMC: a trust based monitoring 
ountermeasure 
ithin this section we propose the Trust Based Botnet Mon- 
toring Countermeasure (TrustBotMC), a novel monitoring 
ountermeasure based on computational trust. TrustBotMC al- 
ows bots in fully distributed botnets to locally compute the 
rustworthiness of their neighbors and take automated coun- 
ermeasures in the form of blacklisting against sensor nodes 
nfiltrating their NL. In the following, we introduce the ideas 
nd assumptions behind TrustBotMC. Afterwards, we discuss 
n detail the three core components of TrustBotMC: the test 
essage concept, the computational trust models and the black- 
isting mechanism. 
Our proposed trust management approach builds on the 
undamental assumption that sensors and crawlers can be 
istinguished from regular bots. We argue that this is the case 
or two reasons: ( i ) the goal and therefore the behavior of mon-
toring mechanisms is different from bots (cf. Section 2.2 ), ( ii )
esearchers and law enforcement officials are bound by legal,
thical and technical constraints. Some of these constrains 
re that sensors should not disseminate commands from the 
otmaster, or aid the overlay maintenance by sending valid 
L-reply messages ( Karuppayah et al., 2017 ). If a sensor vio- 
ates these constraints, it not only raises questions regarding 
he legal and ethical consequences of actively participating 
n the maintenance of the botnet, but it could also prevent 
inkholing attempts against the botnet. The reason for this 
s that sensors are re-implementations of the botnet proto- 
ol but they are unlikely to share the same vulnerabilities as 
he malware itself. Therefore, exploiting a bug in the malware 
o sinkhole the botnet will not affect the sensors. Hence, if 
hese sensors actively share commands or NL-entries with the 
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Fig. 1 – TrustBotMC example: two cases of success and 
failure using the BCM technique. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sinkholed bots, they will allow sinkholed bots to re-connect to
other bots and effectively break the sinkholing attempt. 
To leverage the distinctive behavior of monitoring mech-
anisms, we adapt the concept of test messages ( Fung et al.,
2009 ). At a glance, TrustBotMC regularly sends test messages
to bots and collects experiences based on the validity of the
reply. The collected experiences are fed into a trust model to
compute a continuously updated trust score for each neigh-
bor in a bot’s NL. If the trust value for any of the neighbors
falls below a predefined threshold t min , this neighbor will be
permanently removed from the NL and added to the blacklist.
All messages originating from bots on the blacklist will be ig-
nored indefinitely. 
With this approach bots can locally detect and remove sen-
sor nodes from their NL. This will decrease the popularity
of sensors and therefore their ability to enumerate the bot-
net. This greatly limits the capabilities of researchers and law
enforcement officials to obtain the necessary information re-
quired to take down the botnet. 
To summarize, the proposed mechanism can be described
as a three-tuple T BMC = (M, T, t min ) , with M being a non-empty
set of test messages, a trust model T , and a minimum trust
threshold t min . Each of these three components will be de-
scribed in greater detail in the following subsections. 
3.1. Test messages 
To make decisions about the trustworthiness of a neigh-
bor, bots need to obtain historical data. To obtain this data,
TrustBotMC uses the concept of test messages ( Fung et al.,
2009 ). Bots frequently send special messages to their neigh-
bors for which the (correct) answer is clearly defined/known. If
a neighbor does not reply to the message as expected, a nega-
tive experience is recorded. Similarly upon receipt of a correct
answer a positive experience is recorded. 
While the specific implementations of test messages can
differ, they have to fulfill three conditions: ( i ) they are con-
structed in a way such that the correct answer is prede-
fined/known, ( ii ) a sensor should not (ethical/legal/technical
reasons), or cannot (e.g., due to the encrypted nature of mes-
sages) answer such that the response is considered a posi-
tive experience, ( iii ) regular bots do not, or only rarely (e.g.,
due to churn) answer in a way that is considered a negative
experience. 
We propose two different types of test messages: Bogus
Neighborlist Request (BNLM) messages and BCM messages. Each
of them assumes the aforementioned legal, ethical and tech-
nical limitations of monitoring mechanisms. The reason for
proposing these two test messages is that the type of mes-
sages are common for all known P2P botnets. This has the ben-
efit that a sensor cannot distinguish them from their regular
counterparts. We want to highlight, that a test-message does
not need a non test message counterpart. Botmasters can in-
troduce entirely novel test messages to their botnet if they ful-
fill the three requirements stated earlier. As an example, such
a message could be the command to conduct a short-timed
(DDoS) attack that can be observed by other bots. Complying
with such a test-message would require active participation in
attacks. Therefore, due to the aforementioned legal and ethi-cal reasons, sensors would be distinguishable as they cannot
carry out the attack. 
3.1.1. Bogus command sequence message (BCM) 
A BCM is a specifically crafted hello-message that contains a
very old command sequence number, i.e., significantly lower
than the current command sequence number. Upon receipt of
such a message a bot will reply with its current (higher) com-
mand sequence number and the corresponding command set.
However, contrary to the behavior of a bot, a sensor will not be-
have in the same way and instead send a hel l o−repl y message
that matches the command sequence number of the BCM.
Sensors must behave this way, as they would otherwise have
to attach an updated command set in their reply. As such com-
mand sets are commonly encrypted, the sensor does not know
its contents. Therefore, it might contain content that is either
legally or ethically problematic, or it is a command used by
botmasters to break out of a sinkholing. 
Consequently, a bot will consider the receipt of hel l o− repl y
messages with a (recent) higher command sequence number
as a positive experience, whereas a reply with the same or out-
dated command sequence number is considered a negative
experience. This behavior is also depicted in Fig. 1 . Note that
depending on the specifics of the botnet, a botmaster has to
define what is considered a recent command sequence. Oth-
erwise, sensors could cheat by sending higher, yet outdated,
command sequences. 
We want to point out, that BCMs are unlikely to incur a
great amount of false positive (FP) classifications. Even if a bot
replies with a highly out-dated command sequence number,
it will subsequently be updated and reply correctly to future
test-messages. 
3.1.2. Bogus neighborlist request message (BNLM) 
BNLMs are test messages that target sensors by forcing them
to share legitimate bot entries. However, sharing of legitimate
entries helps the botnet maintain its overlay. Therefore, due to
legal and ethical limitations sensors cannot share bot entries.
Instead they can send empty NL-replies or duplicate addresses
of other sensors ( Andriesse et al., 2015 ). Moreover, sharing
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egitimate entries could prevent so called sinkholing attacks 
gainst the botnet ( Karuppayah et al., 2017 ). 
To cover different behavioral patterns of sensors, a nega- 
ive experience will be recorded for all following scenarios: ( i) 
mpty NL-reply , ( ii) only unresponsive or non-existing bots, ( iii) 
nly blacklisted bots, and ( iv) duplicate entries. 
It is important to mention that many of these replies can 
lso occur in NL-replies of legitimate bots. Therefore, contrary 
o the previously discussed BCM, BNLMs are likely to incur FP 
lassifications. Specifically for botnets with low NL-reply sizes 
e.g., Sality) it is likely that an unresponsive or blacklisted bot 
s returned. Therefore, we expect BNLMs to be more likely to 
ncur FPs than BCMs. 
Theoretically sensors could avoid the test message detec- 
ion strategy by not replying (to the test messages). This be- 
avior would reflect packet losses or a bot going offline during 
he message exchange. Therefore, we consider not receiving 
 reply in a timely manner as a negative experience. While 
his introduces the possibility of additional FPs, we consider 
his insignificant with regard to the overall number of test 
essages sent. Moreover, the approach is designed such that 
est messages are only sent to bots that are considered online,
.e., they replied to a regular hello message beforehand. This 
voids collecting negative experiences for legitimate bots that 
re currently offline. 
.2. Leveraging computational trust 
he test message approach allows a bot to collect positive 
nd negative experiences for each of its neighbors. To decide 
hether to trust or distrust a neighbor, we need to calcu- 
ate the trustworthiness based on the collected evidence. For 
his, we leverage the trust models introduced in Section 2.3 .
y feeding the experiences collected for each neighbor to the 
rust models, we receive an individual trust score for all NL 
ntries. 
.2.1. Trust threshold 
hile the calculated trust scores provide us with an indicator 
f the trustworthiness of a bot, we need a method for inter- 
reting the results. As our goal is to make a binary decision 
bout the trustworthiness of a bot, we propose the utilization 
f a trust threshold. 
In this context, the minimum trust threshold t min repre- 
ents a lower boundary for trust scores. Upon each new ex- 
erience, negative or positive, the trust score is updated ac- 
ording to the respective trust model. If the newly calculated 
core falls below the threshold of t min , the bot associated with 
hat trust score is considered untrustworthy. Once a neigh- 
or is considered to be untrustworthy, it will be blacklisted 
nd removed from a bot’s NL. Effectively, the trust threshold 
an be used to set the strictness of TrustBotMC. A high value 
ill lead to quicker blacklistings, i.e., few negative experiences 
ill quickly lead to a trust score lower than t min . Contrary, a 
ow threshold will allow a greater number of negative expe- 
iences to be collected before a blacklisting occurs. This also 
llows legitimate bots to restore their trust score with positive 
xperiences. Therefore, it depends on the test-messages used 
nd the preferences of the botmaster to choose a proper trust hreshold. For our evaluations we used a parameter study to 
ick a trust threshold that minimizes FPs while maintaining 
igh TPs. 
.2.2. Trust models 
n the context of TrustBotMC , an adapted version of the eBay 
ser rating system is represented as T = T eBay (n ) . Here, n de-
otes the number of experiences that will be used by the 
rust model. More specifically, to compute the trust score, the 
 most recently collected experiences will be taken into ac- 
ount. Moreover, instead of a combined rating for each bot,
very bot maintains their own ratings for each bot on their 
L. This not only allows local computation of trust scores, but 
lso prevents abuse of the rating system by researchers, which 
ould falsely down-rate legitimate bots. 
TrustBotMC uses an extended beta distribution , which is rep- 
esented as T = T Beta (r 0 , s 0 ) . Here, r 0 and s 0 denote the initial
rust. 
Similarly to the beta distribution, Subjective Logic does not 
onsider aging of evidence but takes into account an initial as- 
umption of trust via its base rate parameter a ∈ [0, 1]. In Trust-
otMC , Subjective Logic is represented as T = T SL (a ) . 
CertainTrust is the only trust model introduced that consid- 
rs both aging and other environmental factors. In TrustBotMC ,
ertainTrust is represented as T = T CT ( f, w, a ) . Here, the aging
actor a ∈ [0, 1[ determines the expected number of evidence 
 ∈R + via the formula N = 1 / (1 − a ) . 
.3. Blacklisting 
o prevent a blacklisted bot (i.e., sensor) from causing more 
arm to the botnet, several steps need to be taken to avoid 
urther communication or manipulation by the potential sen- 
or node. To achieve this, TrustBotMC follows a three-step ap- 
roach of: i ) removing the suspected sensor from the NL, ii )
dding it on the blacklist, and iii ) blocking any future commu- 
ication. 
Removing the suspected sensor from the NL will prevent it 
rom being shared through NL-request messages or contacted 
uring a bot’s MM-cycle. Therefore, the sensor will not be able 
o observe the activities of the bot or increase its view of the
otnet. Furthermore, adding the sensor to the blacklist will 
revent re-adding the bot to the NL and allow a bot to filter in-
oming messages from previously blocked sensors. Lastly, by 
gnoring all incoming messages from nodes on a bot’s black- 
ist, sensors cannot obtain any further intelligence about the 
vailability or connectivity of a bot. 
. Evaluation 
ithin this section, we evaluate TrustBotMC and compare the 
ffectiveness of the trust mechanisms used in it. Specifically,
e compare the trust mechanisms against the goodcount ap- 
roach (the reputation-based approach used by the Sality bot- 
et). Furthermore, we evaluate how much information can be 
athered by sensors in the presence of TrustBotMC. Lastly, we 
nvestigate how collaborative monitoring can mitigate the loss 
f monitoring intelligence introduced by TrustBotMC. 
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Fig. 2 – Development of the popularity of a single sensor 
over time with Sality’s goodcount mechanism and different 
trust models compared ( t min = 0 . 4) , M = { BCSM } . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Setup 
For our evaluation, we use the OMNeT++ ( Varga and Hornig,
2008 ) discrete simulation framework. Within OMNeT++, we
utilize a framework (as presented in our previous work Böck
et al., 2018 ) that implements the Sality botnet and extends it,
such that it either uses its original reputation mechanism (i.e.,
goodcount ) or the test message based approach of TrustBotMC
(along with any of the trust management mechanisms dis-
cussed in Section 2.3 ). The decision to use a simulation frame-
work over a real world testbed, allows to evaluate the proposed
mechanism on significantly larger networks. 
To ensure a realistic churn behavior of the bots, we use the
churn model presented by Karuppayah (2016) and Böck et al.
(2018) . Based on the churn model, we simulated a botnet with
a population of 5500 and an average active population of 1422.
We picked this number as it fits the latest reports on the size
of the super-peer population of the Sality botnet ( Haas et al.,
2016 ). While botnets can be of significantly larger size, we ar-
gue that the size of the botnet has no immediate effect on
our mechanism. In TrustBotMC each bot locally computes the
trust score and maintains their own blacklists. Therefore, the
size of the botnet has no immediate effects on the effective-
ness of TrustBotMC. 
In addition to the bot population, we introduced up to 100
sensor nodes to the botnet. As it requires time to develop sen-
sor nodes, it is unrealistic to assume that they are present
from the zero hour of the botnet. Therefore, we use a warm
up period before the sensors join the network. 
As the churn model requires approximately 41 days to sta-
bilize itself ( Böck et al., 2018 ), we decided upon a warm up
period of 50 days before the sensors join the botnet. Once
the sensors join the network, we observe their popularity
for a period of 14 days. Overall, this results in a simula-
tion time of 64 days. During that period, we recorded the
state of the botnet overlay with a granularity of six hours.
To evaluate the effectiveness of each proposed test message,
we conducted three separate experiments: (1) only BCMs,
(2) only BNLMs, and (3) a combination of BNLMs and BCMs
with an equal ratio of both message types. To account for
statistical variances we repeated each of our experiments
16 times. 
For the evaluation of the different trust models, we had to
pick a common threshold t min ∈ [0, 1] and set the parameters
for each trust model. For this, we conducted a parameter study
to identify which parameter combinations perform best. As
the result of this study, we decided upon a minimum thresh-
old of t min = 0 . 4 and the trust parameters specified in the fol-
lowing subsection. Based on the identified threshold, we later
compare the trust model based on the sensor popularity, (TP),
(FP) and (UD). UD denotes sensors that have not been discov-
ered yet by a bot and therefore are not classified yet. Therefore,
the sum of sensor popularity and TP does not always match
the total botnet population as the sensor has not yet been dis-
covered and classified by all bots. 
4.2. Results 
This section presents the evaluation results for BCM and
BNLMs for each of the trust models in comparison against theSality goodcount mechanism. Afterwards, a potential mitiga-
tion based on increased sensor deployment is evaluated and
discussed. 
4.2.1. Bogus commands sequence messages 
To recapitulate, BCMs target the legal, ethical and technical is-
sues of sensor sharing botmaster commands with other bots.
Fig. 2 presents the popularity of a single sensor throughout the
observation period of 14 days for each trust model and the Sal-
ity goodcount . 
The plot highlights that TrustBotMC significantly impedes
the intelligence gathering of the sensor. For Sality, a single sen-
sor, in our simulation, is capable of enumerating the entire
botnet after ten days of deployment in the Sality botnet. This
is not possible in TrustBotMC, where at most 53.436% of the
botnet could be enumerated by a single sensor at the peak of
its popularity. Moreover, this peak occurs after about two days
and then only decreases due to blacklisting. At the end of the
simulation, i.e., after 14 days of monitoring with the sensor,
only 7.49% of the bots have the sensors in their NL. This is not
the case for the unmodified Sality, where the popularity of the
sensor steadily increases. 
Fig. 2 also highlights the differences between the evaluated
trust models. The results show that TrustBotMC indeed mit-
igates the intelligence gathering by the deployed sensor. Out
of the observed trust models, the eBay user rating performed
the best with a peak popularity of the sensor of only 1477. In
comparison, the sensor peaked at a popularity of 2939 if Sub-
jectiveLogic is used as the trust model. Nevertheless, the pop-
ularity of the sensor drops below 500 ( < 10%) for all trust mod-
els after the observation period of 14 days. This poses a signif-
icant problem (for researchers and law enforcement), as node
churn and dynamic IP addresses require monitoring knowl-
edge to be as recent as possible. However, due to TrustBotMC,
sensors quickly lose the ability to collect the latest monitoring
intelligence. 
Furthermore, we investigated the FPs incurred by each
trust model, i.e., falsely blacklisted regular bots. The results
of this are presented in Table 1 alongside with detailed results
on the popularity of the sensors after 14 days of monitoring.
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Table 1 – Performance overview of different trust models 
against a single sensor at its peak popularity and after 
the monitoring period of 14 days ( t min = 0 . 4). The TN are 
omitted from the table due to space reasons and can be 
calculated as 5500 2 − UD − F P. 
Trust model Peak End of simulation 
popularity Popularity (FN) TP FP UD 
T eBay (15) 26.855% 0.6% (33) 5466 0 1 
(1477) 
T Beta (3, 3) 38.073% 2.909% (106) 5394 0 0 
(2094) 
T CT (.5, 5, .95) 46.727% 4.127% (227) 5272 0 1 
(2570) 
T SL (1) 53.436% 7.490% (412) 5088 0 0 
(2939) 
Fig. 3 – Development of the popularity of a single sensor 
over time with Sality’s goodcount mechanism and different 
trust models compared ( t min = 0 . 4) , M = { BNLM } . 
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Table 2 – Performance overview of different trust models 
against a single sensor at its peak popularity and after 
the monitoring period of 14 days ( t min = 0 . 4), M = {BNLM}. 
The TN are omitted from the table due to space reasons 
and can be calculated as 5500 2 − UD − F P. 
Trust model Peak End of simulation 
popularity Popularity (FN) TP FP UD 
T eBay (15) 27.127% 0.745% (41) 5458 11,556,538 1 
(1492) 
T Beta (3, 3) 38.255% 1.873% (103) 5391 37,250 6 
(2104) 
T CT (.5, 5, .95) 46.764% 4.327% (238) 5262 748 0 
(2572) 
T SL (1) 53.582% 7.636% (420) 5080 13 0 
(2947) 
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t is interesting to note that none of the trust models incurred 
ny FPs. This indeed suggests that TrustBotMC is an effective 
nd robust countermeasure against monitoring attempts. 
This is likely the case because TrustBotMC, by de- 
ign, avoids collecting FP experiences for normal bots and 
CMs being robust towards false negative experiences (c.f.
ection 3.1.1 ). Hence, eBay performs best as it makes its de- 
isions faster than the other models, which are designed to 
void decisions that can lead to FPs. 
.2.2. Bogus neighborlist messages 
ext we want to repeat the experiment using BNLMs. BNLMs 
everage that sensors are restrained from sharing legitimate 
L entries with other bots. Contrary to BCMs, bots may answer 
ncorrectly to BNLMs. Therefore, FP classifications are more 
ikely to occur when using BNLM (c.f. Section 3.1.2 ). Fig. 3 de- 
icts the popularity of a single sensor throughout the obser- 
ation period of 14 days for each trust model and the standard 
ality goodcount . 
In comparison to the experiment with BCMs, the two types 
f test messages show only slight deviations with respect to 
he ability of preventing sensors from infiltrating the botnet.owever, as Table 2 highlights, all four trust models incur FPs 
hich is not the case for BCMs. 
Even though the eBay user rating still performs the best,
he results clearly indicate that the eBay user rating incurs 
 significantly larger amount of FP blacklistings compared to 
he other three trust models. In fact, 38% of all possible edges 
ithin the network are removed based on blacklisting. This 
mpacts the resilience of the graph structure of the botnet and 
s undesirable from a botmaster’s perspective. Contrary, while 
L performed worst at preventing sensors from infiltrating a 
ot’s NL it incurs the least FPs (13) throughout our observation 
eriod. CT similarly only incurs 748 FPs, whereas Beta distribu- 
ions incur 37, 250 FPs. Considering, that the overall simulation 
ime of 64 days is fairly short in comparison to real world bot-
ets with lifespans of several years, the results indicate that 
Bay user ratings and the Beta distribution based trust model 
re not suited for deployment in conjunction with test mes- 
ages that are likely to incur negative experiences for legiti- 
ate bots. In such a case, the lesser performing CT or SL trust
odels should be used by botmasters, to impede sensor infil- 
ration while mitigating negative effects on the botnets own 
tructure. 
.2.3. Discussion 
he experiments of running TrustBotMC with BCM and 
NLM yielded differing results. The eBay user rating model 
erformed best at impeding monitoring efforts with sensor 
odes in combination with both test messages . However, in 
ombination with BNLM, it incurred a significant amount of 
Ps which renders it unusable in such a scenario. Interestingly,
o FP were accumulated at all in combination with BCM. The 
eason for this discrepancy lies in the nature of the test mes- 
ages . While a bot may provide incorrect answers to a BNLM 
nder some circumstances, this is not the case for BCMs.
herefore, by the characteristics of BCMs a FP may only hap- 
en if a bot goes offline while being tested. 
In summary, the choice of a proper trust model greatly de- 
ends on the characteristics of the test messages and the pos- 
ibility of bots replying incorrectly. In a setting, where the test 
essage is likely to incur FPs a more robust trust model such as
T or SL should be used. Contrary in a scenario with few pos-
ibilities of FP classifications the more aggressive eBay user 
ating model yields better results. 
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Fig. 4 – Comparison of the popularity of 10, 50 and 100 sensors (collaborating), with Sality’s goodcount mechanism and 
different trust models ( t min = 0 . 4) . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We also repeated our experiments with a combination of
both BCM and BNLM. The results of this are presented in
Appendix A . Lastly, we want to highlight once more that the
test messages used for these experiments are only two possi-
ble options. We chose them for their applicability to a wide
range of P2P botnets. However, botmasters theoretically have
complete freedom of adding arbitrary test messages to aid in
identifying sensor nodes. 
4.3. Mitigation 
As a mechanism such as TrustBotMC significantly impedes
monitoring operations, we need to identify means to continue
monitoring operations. A simple but resource consuming ap-
proach is to increase the number of sensors. In the following,
we investigate how running the same simulations (with 10,
50 and 100 colluding sensor nodes) influences the intelligence
gathered by means of combining the knowledge from all
sensors. 
Fig. 4 a–c depict the combined popularity of 10, 50 and 100
sensors respectively. As expected, the combined intelligencegathered by the sensors increases with an increasing number
of sensors. Our results even indicate that 50 sensors are suffi-
cient to fully enumerate TrustBotMC for a short period, if Sub-
jectiveLogic is used as the trust model. However, with the eBay
trust model at an average of 4088.5 bots (74.44%) were enumer-
ated at the peak using 50 sensors. Throughout the monitoring
period of 14 days this dropped down to 1438.25 bots (26.15%).
Furthermore, even increasing the number of sensors to 100 is
insufficient to fully enumerate the botnet if eBay user rating
is used as the trust model. 
To identify why increasing the number of sensors yielded
only small gains in the overall monitoring knowledge, we
also investigated the popularity of the individual sensors. We
found out, that injecting too many sensors at the same time
leads to a situation where the sensors compete against each
other. The reasons for this are limitations in NL-size, Sality’s
neighbor addition strategy, and the order and time of sensors
joining the botnet. We discuss these findings in more detail in
Appendix B . In summary, this effect is likely to occur in other
botnets as well. Therefore, increasing the number of sensors
might be more efficient for monitoring other botnets. 
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Overall the results indicate that increasing the number of 
ensors can help to mitigate the effect that TrustBotMC has on 
onitoring operations. However, the limited success and sig- 
ificant resource overhead are clear indicators that we need 
ore advanced monitoring strategies to overcome advanced 
onitoring countermeasures such as TrustBotMC. One possi- 
le approach is to develop smart approaches for collaborative 
onitoring, as the straightforward method of increasing the 
umber shows odd effects such as sensors competing for pop- 
larity. 
. Related work 
n this section we discuss the state of the art by emphasizing 
n (botnet) monitoring countermeasures cas well as on tech- 
iques for detecting sensors and crawlers. 
.1. Botnet monitoring countermeasures 
ountermeasures against monitoring are a common feature 
f P2P botnets. Among the most typical countermeasures is 
ate limiting the size of NL-reply messages ( Andriesse et al.,
014; Falliere, 2011; Neville and Gibb, 2013 ). This is supposed 
o prevent crawlers from easily obtaining full information 
bout a bot’s neighbors. In addition, the GameOver Zeus bot- 
et also implements an automated blacklisting mechanism 
hat triggers if more than five NL-request messages are sent 
rom the same IP address within a sliding window of one 
inute ( Andriesse et al., 2014 ). As discussed in Section 2.3 , the
ality botnet ( Falliere, 2011 ) implements the so-called good- 
ount mechanism to prevent sensor nodes from easily replac- 
ng legitimate bots that have been reliable over a prolonged 
eriod of time. The goodcount mechanism prevents replacing 
ong lived and reliable NL-entries with newer potentially unre- 
iable neighbors. This also affects sensors, as it becomes more 
ifficult to infiltrate and remain in a bot’s NL (c.f. Appendix B ).
.2. Sensor and crawler detection 
n ( Böck et al., 2015; Karuppayah et al., 2017 ) the authors 
resent how sensor nodes can be detected within P2P botnets 
ased on three different graph metrics. In more details, they 
ake use of the local clustering coefficient, PageRank ( Page 
t al., 1999 ) and strongly connected components to identify 
ensor nodes in the overlay graph. Their approach is based 
n the assumption, that sensors will not aid the botnet by re- 
urning legitimate bot entries upon a NL-request . While these 
echanisms effectively identify sensor nodes, they require an 
ggregated view or global knowledge on the graph connectiv- 
ty. On the contrary, our approach only requires a bot’s local 
nowledge to autonomously blacklist sensor nodes. 
In Andriesse et al. (2015) , Andriesse et al. investigate how 
rawlers and sensors can be detected based on protocol and 
ehavioral anomalies. Specifically for crawlers their approach 
as proven to be successful. The anomalies used by the au- 
hors to identify the crawlers cover both protocol and behav- 
oral anomalies. Furthermore, they show how sensors can be 
etected based on protocol violation. Nevertheless, they state 
hat their approach is not generally applicable to the detection f sensor nodes, as violations could be avoided in sensor im- 
lementations. Karuppayah et al. also use protocol violations 
o autonomously detect crawlers based on a bot’s local view 
 Karuppayah et al., 2016 ). Their approach is based on setting 
raps targeting the behavior of crawlers to locally identify and 
ubsequently blacklist crawlers. 
. Conclusion 
ully distributed botnets exhibit a unique level of resilience 
gainst take down attempts and monitoring. Recent work in- 
icates that essential intelligence gathering mechanisms can 
e detected and repelled by botmasters. In this article, we con- 
ribute to this field by presenting TrustBotMC, a method for lo- 
ally and autonomously identifying sensors in P2P botnets via 
he utilization of computational trust and special messages 
hat are exchanged between bots. We want to point out, that 
rustBotMC assumes that defenders are bound to legal and 
thical restrictions. If these restrictions are circumvented (e.g.,
or reasons of national security) TrustBotMC will not be effec- 
ive. Nevertheless, we argue that such a scenario is not gen- 
rally applicable to all botnets. Our evaluation results suggest 
hat the use of TrustBotMC can significantly reduce the bene- 
ts of sensor monitoring. In particular, we show that Trust- 
otMC is much more efficient in detecting and blacklisting 
ensor nodes than existing mitigation mechanisms in bot- 
ets; that is, Sality’s goodcount mechanism. Moreover, we ex- 
mine collaborative methods for mitigating the TrustBotMC 
hreat. While collaboration seems to be a promising solution 
o continue successful monitoring operations, the straightfor- 
ard approach of simply sharing data shows odd effects of 
ensors competing against each other. Nevertheless, increas- 
ng the number of sensors, while requiring a lot of resources,
oes increase the overall monitoring intelligence. Moreover,
ncreasing the number of sensors allows to slow down the loss 
f monitoring information due to blacklistings by TrustBotMC.
o further mitigate the effects of monitoring countermeasures 
uch as TrustBotMC, we suggest future work to focus on al- 
ernative monitoring approaches as suggested in Böck et al.
2018) as well as to more advanced collaboration strategies 
hat avoid competition among sensors. 
cknowledgements 
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ppendix A. BNLM +BCM 
e repeated our experiments for TrustBotMC with equally 
istributed numbers of BCMs and BNLMs. Fig. B.5 indicates,
hat the results for the popularity of the sensor are similar to 
sing only one of the two test-message types. However, the 
umber of FP incurred by the trust models shows a more in- 
eresting pattern. While eBay incurred 35.46% less FPs than 
nly using BNLMs, the Beta distribution incurred 77.22% less 
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Table A1 – Performance overview of different trust mod- 
els against a single sensor at its peak popularity and af- 
ter the monitoring period of 14 days ( t min = 0 . 4, M = 
{ BCLM , BCM } ). 
Trust Model Peak End of simualtion 
popularity Popularity TP FP UD 
T eBay (15) 27.309% (1502) 0.764% (42) 5456 7,458,526 2 
T Beta (3, 3) 38.036% (2092) 1.945% (107) 5393 8484 0 
T CT (0.5, 5, 0.95) 46.309% (2547) 4.091% (225) 5275 88 0 
T SL (1) 53.527% (2944) 7.436% (409) 5091 1 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. B2 – Comparison of the average popularity of 50 (non 
collaborating) sensors over time with Sality’s goodcount 
mechanism and different trust models ( t min = 0 . 4) . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FPs. This indicates, that the Beta distribution may be usable in
combination with test-messages that generate a lower num-
ber of false negative experiences than BNLMs. This is interest-
ing, as using the Beta distribution model is more effective at
blacklisting sensors than SL or CT. Therefore, botmasters need
a deep understanding of the deployed test-messages to chose
the trust model that provides high TP classifications with min-
imal FPs. 
Appendix B. Competing sensors 
In Section 4.3 we investigated how deploying additional sen-
sors improved the intelligence gathered during monitoring
operations. We observed, that the additional information
gained decreases with rising numbers of sensors. To investi-
gate why this occurs, we analyzed the popularity of individual
sensors. Fig. B.6 presents the average popularity of a sensor in
a group of 50 colluding sensors. In comparison to Fig. 2 , we
observe that the average popularity of the 50 sensors is signif-
icantly lower than the popularity of one single sensor. 
We investigate whether the aforesaid observation is related
to the way sensors are deployed during the simulation. That
is, sensors are deployed within a quick succession. This leads
to a scenario where a large number of sensors attempt to in-
filtrate NLs at the same time, effectively competing against
each other. Hence, we examined how injecting sensors at aFig. B1 – Development of the popularity of a single sensor 
over time with Sality’s goodcount mechanism and different 
trust models compared ( t min = 0 . 4, M = { BCLM , BCM } ). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
slower pace influences their popularity. However, even 40 min
intervals between injecting the sensors did not solve the prob-
lem. While even longer intervals might reduce the competi-
tion among sensors, it will also spread out the monitoring in-
telligence across a longer period of time. Therefore, the peak
popularity of all sensors will remain high for a longer period of
time, but the overall peak will be lower. In fact, deploying 100
sensors with 40 min intervals, causes the last sensor to join
only once the first sensors are starting to be blacklisted and
dropping in popularity. Therefore, we attempt to optimize the
peak popularity of the sensors by injecting them in quick suc-
cession. 
The specific effects of this competition among sensors de-
pends on the design of the MM-protocol. In the following, we
discuss the specific effects of the Sality MM-protocol and dis-
cuss why similar effects are expected for other MM-designs. 
Sality MM. Sensors can infiltrate a bot’s NL by sending a
server announcement message. The receiving bot will then ei-
ther add the sensor to an empty slot in its NL or replace the
newest entry. Due to the design of the Sality MM at most 20
empty slots exist in a Sality NL before a bot actively asks for
additional entries to populate its NL. Therefore, if sensors join
in quick succession, they must compete for at most 20 empty
slots within a bot’s NL. Once the free slots are occupied, a sen-
sor will most likely replace another sensor in the bot’s NL. This
leads to a situation, where the first 19 sensors may obtain an
empty slot in a bot’s NL and all following sensors actively re-
place other sensors. Fig. B.7 depicts the popularity of individ-
ual sensors out of 100 in the order they joined the botnet. The
first 20 have a higher popularity as they had a better chance of
occupying empty slots. Consequently, a large group of sensors
have a similar and comparatively low popularity. This changes
again for the last sensors injected to the botnet. As there are
less or no sensors joining the botnet after them, they are less
likely to be replaced and maintain a higher popularity. 
This indicates, that injecting large amounts (i.e., ≥ 20) of
sensors into the Sality botnet at the same time only yields
marginal improvements in monitoring knowledge. To over-
come this drawback, we suggest two possible approaches:
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Fig. B3 – Popularity after four days for individual (non collaborating) sensors in the order of joining the botnet. 
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 i ) inject sensors with greater inter-arrival times or ( ii ) develop 
ore balanced approaches to inject large groups of sensors. 
ther-MM-protocols While the discussed effect of competing 
ensors is specific for the Sality botnet, it is likely to occur in 
ther botnets as well. If a MM-protocol allows large sets of new 
ots to enter a NL this will make the botnet susceptible to NL- 
oisoning attacks ( Rossow et al., 2013 ), i.e., a defender could 
eplace all existing entries with sensor to sinkhole all botnet 
raffic. Therefore, most botnets will prevent a large number of 
ots or sensors to join a NL in quick succession. 
upplementary material 
upplementary material associated with this article can be 
ound, in the online version, at doi: 10.1016/j.cose.2019.01.004 . 
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